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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Four  months  ago,  I  spoke before  a  distinguished 
group of American  economists  (National  Economists  Club,  March 
16,  1982)  on  a  subject similar to the one  I  have  been  asked  to 
speak on  today.  Assessing the prospects  for  transatlantic 
trade relations,  I  preaicted that things would  get worse before 
they got better. 
Unfortunately,  I  seem to have  been vindicated. 
The  optimism which preceded the Versailles  Summit 
has  been overshadowed  by  the continuation  o~ trade-restrictive 
actions  on  the part of  the European  Community's  (E.C.)  leading 
trade partner,  the United States. 
As  the world economic  recession persists,  we  are 
witnessing the  growing inability of  governments  to resist 
protectionist pressures  from  domestic interest groups  in both 
the industrial and agricultural sectors.  Furthermore,  there 
is emerging  on  the European  side of  the Atlantic  a  perception 
that the United States is insensitive to the economic  plight of 
Western  Europe.  Countervailing duties  on  steel exports, 
limitationson East-West trade,  and persistent high interest 
rates are only  some  of the U.S.  actions which are troubling-
Western  Europe. 
Moreover,  the fact that the world  economy will recover only 
modestly,  if at all,  over  the next half-year or year  - combined 
with  two  consecutive years  of virtually no  growth  - is - 2  -
accentuating the level.of frustration  and  pessimism among 
peoplesand governments  on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Before  I  outline  some  of the major  issues in u.s.-
Western  European  economic  relations,  I  would  like to take  a 
few  moments  to describe the European  Community's  role  and 
objectives in the  trade area.  Only in this way,  I  think, 
c~n the B.C.'s views on international economic policy be fully 
understood. 
II.  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  AND  TRADE 
The  consolidation of  ten national economies,  a 
process  that began  some  25  years  ago,  has  created the world's 
largest trading entity.  The  E.C.,  excluding internal trade, 
accounts  for  22%  of all world trade.  The  United States'  share 
is 15%;  Japan's  9%  (1980). 
Commitment  to  free  trade was  a  key  element in the 
creation and  development of the  Community  and  remains  an 
essential element of Europe's  economic  survival.  The B.C.'s 
high trade dependency is evidenced by  a  trade deficit with the 
( 
world which  totalled some  $58  billion in 1981  (1982  Economic 
Report of the President.  U.S.  deficit in 1981 was  $31.4 billion). 
By  assuming  the trade policy responsibilities of 
ten member  states,  the E.C.  has  been able to moderate  the 
protectionist pressures exercised within the member  states, all - 3  -
of which  are  subject to similar pressures domestically 
that the U.S.  government is.  The  challenge of the  European 
institutions,  and  one which has  met with relative success, 
is continually to balance inevitable protectionist pressures 
against free-market  forces. 
The  United States has  greatly benefited  from Europe's 
growth.  The  E.C.  is the United States'  largest single export 
market.  -rn 1981,  tJ:l:e  United States enjoyed  a  $10.7 billion 
trade  surplus with  the  European  Community. 
Western  Europe  today,  like the United States,  is 
in the midst of  a  severe  economic crisis.  The  E.C.,  with its 
270  million people  (U.S.  has  230  million)  and  a  GDP  which, 
like that of the U.S.,  is close to  $3  trillion,  is facing 
continued,  if somewhat  abated,  inflation  (over  12%  on 
average  in the  E.C.)  and  growing  unemployment  [11 million 
or over  9.3%.  (1981  OECD  figures]. 
The  Community's  GDP  declined by  0.7%  in 1981  from 
1980  (OECD  figures)  and,  unless ·the United States experiences 
substantial recovery in the  second half of 1982,  it will grow 
by  no  more  than  1.5%  in 1982. 
This  economic  situation in the  Community  and  the 
equallyworrisome  economic  situation in the United States 
exacerbate the  economic  tensions across  the Atlantic.  The 
convergence of disagreements  on  a  number  of economic  issues 
has  created perhaps  a  severe transatlantic crisis. - 4  -
III.  STEEL  SECTOR 
The  issue of steel exports  from  the European 
Community  to the United States is the most  recent manifestation 
of the  transatlantic trade  tensions that have characterized our 
relations  for close to  a  generation. 
The  decision last month  by  the Department  of 
Commerce  to  impose  countervailing  d~ties on  European  Community 
steel imports  is a  matter of grave  concern to us.  The  result 
of this decision is that steel exports of  a  substantial value 
from certain E.C.  member  states will be virtually eliminated 
from  the  U.S.  market. 
This decision is all the more  unfortunate because 
over the last ten years  the  Community  has  adopted  a  series of 
difficult,  painful  and  far-reaching measures  to restructure its 
steel industry.  Production capacity has  already been drastically 
reduced  and is continuing to decline.  Official assistance to 
the  industry has  been  subjected to very stringent criteria and 
a  gradual phase-out which will be  completed  by  the  end  of 1985. 
The  irony of this step to  impose duties at this 
time is that it will undermine  the  Community's  efforts at re-
structuring its steel industry,  a  goal  shared by  the United States, 
whose  steel industry is suffering  from  similar structural problems. 
It is interesting to note that E.C.  steel exports 
to the U.S.  constitute a  mere  5%  of the American market.  The 
problems  of the  U.S.  steel industry,  in our  view,  can be  ascribed 
to  the U.S.  recession,  high U.S.  interest rates,  which  discourage - 5  -
investment  for plant modernization,  and  an  overvalued dollar, 
which  favours  imports.  As  the  New  York  Times  said less than 
a  month  ago  (editorial on  June  18,  1982): 
"No  legal or diplomatic maneuvering can  solve  the 
industry's  fundemantal  problems:  excess capacity and 
low productivity." 
The  impact of this recent decision on steel 
imports will be  the  increased cost of steel products  to the 
u.s.  consumer  and  continued deterioration of the U.S.  steel 
industry,  which is thus  further protected  from the need to 
adjust to world competitiveness. 
Many  have  claimed that this action by  the United 
States ·could  be  the first shot in a  major  trade war  among  the 
world's  industrialized nations.  It is true that no  country 
previously has  tried to countervail against the industrialized 
policies of its leading partners  on  so massive  a  scale. 
However,  while  the reaction in Europe  has  been 
strong,  we will attempt  to refrain  from  actions  that would 
escalate the dispute. 
IV.  AGRICULTURE 
The  situation in the  field of agriculture is no 
better.  There  has  been  a  noticeable heightening of  the criticism 
of the B.C.'s agricultural trade policies over the past year. 
The  E.C.  remains  the world's  largest importer of 
agricultural  goods,  and  the U.S.  benefits  from  a  $7  billion 
agricultural trade surplus with the  E.C.  The  E.C.  imports  from - 6  -
the u.s.  such key agricultural commodities  as  corn,  soy beans, 
and other animal  feedstuffs. 
Nevertheless,  consum~~  by  a  seemingly great desire 
to provide  the U.S.  farmers  with higher prices  and  larger export 
markets,  some  U.S.  government officials have  'escalated' 
agricultural disputes  and  raised the level of rhetoric,  by openly 
challenging the  arrangements  of the  Common  Agricultural Policy. 
This  has  been  done  in disregard  of~agreements reached  in the  Tokyo 
and earlier  'rounds'  of trade negotiations. 
The  E.C.  has  been  attacked for being responsible  for  the 
growing difficulties - particularly in export markets  - being 
experienced by  the American  farmer.  It is absolutely absurd to 
ascribe this blame  to the  Common  Agricultural Policy at a  time of 
world record crops  and  low world prices  for  many  agricultural 
commodities  and of  a  spectacularly high value of the dollar and 
high interest rates internally. 
The  E.C.  in particular stands  accused of subsidizing 
its exports of agricultural commodities,  which  allegedly reduces 
the potential access of u.s.  products  in third markets.  The  use 
of agricultural subsidies is permitted by  a  'code'  negotiated and 
agreed  to in the  Tokyo  Round  of trade negotiations,  as  long as 
these subsidies  do  not entail the acquisition of more  than  an 
equitable share of world trade.  We  have  abided by  this code. 
The  United States,  by  filing an  unparalleled number  of 
cases  against the  E.C.  for,adjudication to the  GATT- for wheat 
flour,  sugar,  poultry,  pasta,  canned fruit,  raisins and  citrus -
risks straining the dispute settlement process. - 7  -
In addition,  perhaps  more  dangerous  than  these 
rhetorical and  legal challenges  to European policies is what 
is perceived to be  an  American preoccupation for altering the 
arrangements  for  regulating trade policy. 
As  the U.S.  uses  the  GATT  instruments  to seek 
adjudication of  a  series of disputes  on  both industrial and 
agricultural  goods,  we  find it even  more difficult to understand 
declarations according to which  the U.S.  would  press  for  a  revision 
of  GATT  rules,  should the cases not  go  its way.  This would set 
a  dangerous  precedent for  other countries,  that in turn could 
themselves  seek  renegotiation of  GATT  rules if future  cases went 
against them.  Such  renegotiations  are particularly dangerous 
for the preservation of free  trade in times of  low  growth  and 
high  unemployment. 
At  a  time  when  world  demand  in agricultural products is 
increasing,  how  can we  tell our  farmers  that they cannot 
participate in world  trade expansion?.  This being said,  overall 
E.C.  agricultural exports,  as  a  percentage of world agricultrual 
exports,  have risen  from  10  to  11%  between  1971  and  1980,  while 
the u.s.  share went  from  14%  to  17%  in the  same  period. 
v.  EAST-WEST  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS 
Another  continuing problem in the  United States-E.C. 
relationship is the differing approaches  each of us  takes vis-
a-vis economic  relations with  the Eastern bloc,  particularly 
the Soviet Union. - 8  -
The  recent decision by  the American Administration 
to place restrictions on  the  sale of European pipeline-related 
equipment which  contains  components  manufactured  under u.s. 
license or is produced by  U.S.  subsidiaries,  illustrates the 
differing perceptions  between Western  Europe  and  the United 
States on  how  to conduct East-West  economic  relations. 
In  the E.C.'s view,  this action- taken without 
consultation with the  Community  - involves  an extra-territorial 
extension of u.s.  jurisdiction  whi~h,  in the  circumstances,  is 
contrary to the principles of international  law,  unacceptable 
to the  Community  and  unlikely to be  recognized  in E.C.  courts. 
On  a  more  general,level,  the pipeline  'case'  reflects 
differing approaches  of  how  to deal with the Soviet Union  and 
its East European allies.  These  approaches  differ because  the 
nature of the European relationship with the Soviet Union  cannot 
be  the  same  as  that of the United States. 
- Western  Europe  shares  the  same  continent with the 
Soviet Union  and  the Eastern European  nations; 
- While  our political ideologies  and  economic  systems 
differ,  we  have historical,  social and  in  some  cases 
personal associations with the East which  cannot be 
ignored; 
Finally,  our  economic  interrelationship is more 
intricate and  involves  both  a  wider  spectrum and 
a  greater volume  of products. - 9  -
The  European  view  on  East-West trade is that severe 
limitations on  trade are counter-productive,  economically  and 
politically,  and will be  hurting  those who  are  imposing  them 
more  than  those against whom  they are  imposed. 
True,  prudence  should be exercised when  granting 
export credits and  transferring technology to the Eastern bloc 
countries. 
We  have  agreed with the  Un~ted States that East-West 
trade  should be  of equal benefit to both  sides  and  not result in 
the transfer of militarily-relevant•high technology.  Within the 
' 
COCOM,  the Western  European allies have  demonstrated their 
willingness  to adopt  a  more  restrictive policy vis-a-vis high 
technology exports  to  the countries of Eastern Europe. 
However,  only by maintaining  a  respectable level of 
trade with the Eastern bloc  can we  hope  to stabilize East-West 
political relations  and  encourage  some  process of change  in 
Eastern  Europe. 
VI.  EXPORT  CREDITS 
The  issue of export credits at lower-than-market rates 
has  been preoccupying u.s.  and  E.C.  policy makers  for  many 
months  now.  The  United States has  been pressing for  rates that 
would  be  close to or equal  to market rates. 
As  you  know,  the E.C.  has  recently approved  a  proposal 
for  a  new  export credit  'consensus'  within the  OECD  framework 
that raises interest rates  and  re-classifies certain countries, 
including the Soviet Union,  in  a  higher category,  putting it in 
the  same  category  as  other industrialized countries. - 10  -
Let there be  no  misunderstanding  about the  ~easons for 
the  delays on  reaching  agreement.  The  E.C.  has  not disagreed 
that present rates  should be raised and that there should be 
a  reclassification of certain nations.  Our  disagreement has 
rested on  the degree of credit-rate increases,  the reclassification 
' 
of  some  E.C.  countries  and  the need  for  a  transitional adjustment 
period for  some  Third World  nations. 
VII.  INTEREST  RATES  AND  EXCHAN~E-RATE POLICY 
Continuous  high  and volatile U.S.  interest and  exchange 
rates exacerbate many  of the trade-related problems  confronting 
the American  as well as  European  governments. 
Given  the increasing interdependence of Western  economies 
and  the  still-dominant role of  the dollar in international 
transactions,  the fiscal  and  monetary policies of the United  States 
unquestionably  have  a  direct impact  on  European  economies. 
European countries have  been,  and_are still today,  de  facto 
prisoners of u.s.  monetary  and credit policies.  Since  1979, 
excessively high real interest rates in the  U.S.  have  provoked 
a  renewed  flow  of  funds  into the dollar.  Record-high real u.s. 
interest rates  and  the related appreciation of the dollar, while 
benefiting European  exports  over  time,  have  depressed capital 
investment in Europe,  and  made  the restructuring process more 
difficult. 
Of  course,the effects on  Europe  of American interest 
rate developments  and  budgetary policy are also  a  reflection of - 11  -
the weakeness  of the European  economies  themselves.  However, 
the  role of the  state in Western  Europe  has  always  been much 
greater than in the United States.  Budgets  have historically 
represented  a  larger percentage of GNP;  and  budget deficits 
have  been  considerably larger as well;  but their financing 
created few  problems,  due  primarily to the traditionally high 
European propensity to save.  Because of the  tremendous  openness 
of European_capital markets,  the high U.S.  interest rates have 
created problems with regard to major capital outflows,  exchange 
rate instabilities and balance of payments.  As  European 
governments  have  been obliged to adapt their monetary policies 
- to those of the United States,  their scope of action has 
consequently been significantly limited in trying to start 
economic  recovery  and  fight unemployment.  In addition,  as  a 
direct consequence of  the  U.S.  monetary policy,  Europe  now  has,  for  the 
first time,  difficulty in meeting its financing requirements. 
Apart  from  concern  about the  high  level of U.S. 
interest rates,  there is also widespread  concern in Europe 
regarding  the volatility of U.S.  interest rates  and  the effect 
that it has  had  in raising exchange-rate volatility.  The 
exchange-rate volatility that we  have  recently witnessed tends 
to discourage  investment,  impede  growth,  and  represents  a 
substantial barrier to international trade.  Decisions not to 
intervene in the  financial markets  have  accentuated this volatility. 
There  have  been  recent signals,  however,  that greater U.S. 
cooperation on  exchange  intervention is possible,  as  evidenced by 
the u.s.  intervention last month  when  the French  franc was -----·----------------------------
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devalued and  the Deutschmark revalued.  Exchange-rate stability 
is an  important element of  economic  recovery  for  Western  Europe 
and must  be  achieved. 
VIII.  UNITARY  TAXATION 
Another  long-standing  source of  friction in u.s.-
E.C.  relations is that of unitary taxation.  On  several 
occasions  over the past  few  years,  ~.C.  members  presented 
official demarches  to the U.S.  government  expressing their 
dissatisfaction with the application by  certain American  . 
states  (California in particular)  of  the world-wide  combined 
reporting method  on  subsidiaries of European-based corporations. 
This  system of taxation,  based on  a  formula  which  includes 
worldwide  income  rather than  income  generated within a  state, 
contravenes understandings  agreed to by all  OECD  states  (including 
the United States);  is contrary to accepted  and  honored 
international understandings  that a  nation may  not tax a  foreign 
company  on its worldwide  income,  but only on  income  generated 
within  the  taxing nation;  violates international tax treaties; 
and is an  inevitable source of double  taxation  problems~ 
In our view,  only  the  separate accounting,  or  'arm
1s 
length,'  system is fair and  reasonable in taxing international 
business.  In addition to demarches  earlier this year,  the  E.C. 
has  urged  the administration to support the  desire by  the  U.S. 
Solicitor General's office to file an  amicus  curiae brief in - 13  -
the U.S.  Supreme  Court  arguing that worldwide  combined 
reporting is unconstitutional.  (We  are satisfied with the 
brief that was  actually filed,  and  we  hope  that the u.s. 
Administration will continue to push in that direction.) 
The  persistence of this taxation system would,  in 
the short-term,  have  a  negative influence on potential 
European  investment in those states that continue to embrace 
the principle of unitary taxation,  and,  in the  long-term, 
could not but reduce  general  levels of investment.  Furthermore, 
outside the United States,  possible; 'retaliatory'  measures  by 
foreign  countries or their own  political subdivisions cannot be 
ruled out. 
While  we  understand the motivations  on  the part of 
individual states in imposing  such  a  system,  it must  be realized 
that Western  European  governments  face the  same  severe  economic 
constraints  on  available financial  resources.  The  unilateral 
application of the worldwide  combined reporting system 
unnecessarily further  damages  already greatly strained economic 
relations. IX. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
After having  outlined the major  problems, it is only fair 
that  I  attempt to suggest  some  solutions. 
First, it is important to  adop~ a  pragmatic  approach  and 
!.-
non-confrontational  tone  in our .relations.  This  is-difficult to do 
when  economic interests are at stake.  Yet,  I  would  submit that, 
thus  far,  we  have  prevented the  eruption of conflicts in the  trade 
area and  the  the export credit area.  Through  the mechanisms  of the 
GATT  and of  the OECD,  we  have  succeeded in  "managing"  numerous  pro-
blems.  Granted,  the process is currently being severely strained 
and  numerous  questions are being raised about  the need  to alter 
these mechanisms.  What is critical,  however,  is the need to play 
by  and  Stick to rules that have  been set forth.  Otherwise,  the 
potential for  chaos  is high. 
Second,  we  must  address  the problems  one-by-one,  by  focusing 
on  the ones  which  can affect our  economic  relations most  egregiously 
and which  have  the best chance of being resolved.  Trying to solve 
all the problems all at once  becomes  an  impossible  task and  only  leads 
to frustration  and  failure. 
In my  view,  the steel issue is the  one  to which  the first 
priority must  be  given,  because  the  longer  a  resolution of this pro-
blem is not  found,  the greater are the risks of counter-measures. 
Our  disagreement on  the steel trade  issue  - I  am  convinced  - can be 
worked  out.  The  E.C.  has  declared its intention not  to retaliate at 
this stage because  of  our confidence  in being able to work  out our --~--------------------------
- 15  -
differences  through mutually acceptable arrangements 
regarding  the  amount  and  nature of steel exports to the 
United States.  Such  an attitude is the necessary prerequisite 
for  the  avoidance  of  a  trade war  between  Europe  and America. 
Third,  we  must  - on both sides of the Atlantic - commit 
ourselves to broadening and  intensifying the process of 
consultation and  dialogue at all levels  - including the highest 
- of  government.  Over  the past  few  months,  high-level officials 
in_the_E.c:  and  the United States have  sought to institutionalize 
the process of discussion  and  consultation by  regularizing 
meetings  among  officials.  Only  through intensified bilateral 
contacts  can  current conflicts be  resolved satisfactorily. 
Fourth,  there needs  to be  a  greater sensitivity towards 
one another's political and  economic  circumstances  in the 
formulation  and  implementation of policies,  and  a  greater 
confidence in one  another.  This  is essential if we  wish to have 
an effective strategy towards  the Soviet Union  and the Eastern 
bloc.  Our  objectives vis-a-vis the  Soviet Union  av.e  similar. 
The  means  to accomplish these objectives  seem,  more  often than 
not,  to be different.  Wrong  perceptions  about  each other's 
motivations create an  atmosphere of  suspicion and  irritation 
that is detrimental to the transatlantic relationship.  Correct-
ing perceptions  seems  like an  impossible task;  but it is one  that 
must  be  done.  It is a  difficult and often frustrating task and 
one  that will probably take many  years  to bear fruit;  but we  must 
carry on with it today,  tomorrow  and  on  every conceivable occasion. - 16  -
The  U.S.-E.C.  relationship has  been fraught 
with crises  and conflicts  among  its participants from  the time of 
its inception more  than  a  generation ago.  Most  of these crises and 
conflicts have  been,  if not surmounted,  at least handled in such  a 
way  as  to ensure  the continuation of  a  relationship that has  pro-
vide~ a  peace  and prosperity unparalleled  i_n  modern history. 
The  current continuing economic  recession has  exacerbated tensions 
-to an unusual degree  and  has  heightened the concern  about the  long-
term health of  the relationship  •.. 
! 
Yet,  while  the  con~&gence ~f so many  challenges at the  same  time 
may  cause  us  to despair  about  our ability to reconcile our differences, 
I  am  convinced  that enough  good faith  and  good  men  remain  on both sides 
of the Atlantic to refurbish the relationship and  ultimately to 
strengthen it further. 